By Himal Kotelawala

COLOMBO — On Monday (July 29), the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) voted against backing President Ranil Wickremesinghe at the 2024 presidential election, opting instead to field its own candidate. The calculations that went into this decision are likely more complex than meets the eye and, given what is at stake, are worth discussing.

At the outset, it must be noted that in the absence of closely guarded inside information and scientifically sound polling data, any speculation on the outcome of a national election that’s still some time away has to necessarily involve reasoning built on publicly available information and a certain amount of guesswork. This analysis, therefore, attempts to work out the least unlikely rationale behind the SLPP politburo’s decision and its possible implications, based on information already at hand.

Why did the SLPP turn its back on President Wickremesinghe? There are several possibilities. One is that the pohottuwa (lotus bud) is not confident of Wickremesinghe’s chances at the polls and, for obvious reasons, does not want to be party to a losing campaign. Another is that the Rajapaksas, who control the party and would presumably want to tighten their grip on the pohottuwa’s stem in light of Tuesday’s (July 30) apparent almost-coup, fear that the SLPP is in danger of being decimated at the next parliamentary election.

Even if Wickremesinghe wins the presidential election with their support, it is only a matter of time before he dissolves parliament and the SLPP has to face a bitter and resentful public that is in no mood to forgive or forget. Without accurate polling data, it is hard to estimate with any confidence how much of the SLPP’s nationalist + rural base is still intact in the wake of the 2022 financial crisis and the Aragalaya protests, but chances are it is less than a shadow of its former self.

Assuming that a significant percentage of the 6.9 million voters who elected Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2019 have now moved on from the SLPP, the party’s prospects at even becoming the next main opposition are slim but, encouragingly for them, not altogether nonexistent. It would not be unreasonable to believe that former president and SLPP leader Mahinda Rajapaksa is eyeing the opposition leadership for his son and heir apparent Namal Rajapaksa, who replaced his uncle Basil Rajapaksa as SLPP National Organiser in March this year.

In the event the SLPP fields a candidate of the likes of business tycoon Dhammika Perera, whose victory in September would be less than likely, Namal can position himself in the campaign trail as a left-of-centre national leader-in-waiting by championing a pro-poor, populist cause in direct opposition to President Wickremesinghe’s “austere”, “neoliberal” reform agenda, with an updated version of the Rajapaksa brand of nationalism mixed with a veneer of trendy progressivism thrown in.

In fact, the younger Rajapaksa is already making the right noises, waxing eloquent on the SLPP’s “left nationalist” credentials against Wickremesinghe’s centre-right, western-oriented United National Party (UNP). An SLPP-led alliance cobbled together under his leadership at the next parliamentary election could then take on either the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) or the NPP for the benches that occupy the main opposition.

Complicating matters, however, 92 MPs representing the SLPP have pledged their support to the president, with some of the more prominent of them daring to call out the “brash decision” of an “inexperienced group” to not endorse Wickremesinghe. Some of these MPs have also intimated that party leader Mahinda Rajapaksa, who they still profess loyalty to, is not fully on board the politburo’s official decision. While this development does not necessarily herald a mass exodus similar to what happened to the UNP in 2020 with the near-fatal breakaway of the SJB, it has all the hallmarks of a crack in the party even if it does not transpire to be a deep fissure.

For all intents and purposes, the SLPP is now split, even if temporarily, and the Rajapaksas are savvy enough to recognize the optics of that and its implications for their own political future. This means that, with the election still seven weeks away, a reversal of the official position cannot be ruled out. Notably, the president himself has been careful not to put too much distance between himself and the former first family.

However, at least for the time being, it appears that the party is sticking to its guns. In any case, the fact remains that the pohottuwa will be on its own at a parliamentary election and whatever decision it takes on the presidential poll now would have to be with the outcome of the future, more bitterly fought election in mind. To what extent the “dissident” MPs figure into this political calculus and whether or not there is a behind-the-scenes fail-safe understanding between them and the party leadership remains an open question.

This brings us to the dilemma Wickremesinghe is now faced with. Considering that his incumbency, for all its achievements on the economic front, has been coloured by allegations of blocking accountability, putting as much distance as possible between himself and the alleged architects of the crisis can only benefit him. On the other hand, he needs the backing of at least one mainstream political party in order to clinch the ever-elusive mandate and, given the state of his own UNP, it would be in his interest to secure the blessings of Mahinda Rajapaksa whose charisma, it is safe to assume, still commands some respect among sizeable sections of the Sinhala Buddhist majority, particularly among older demographics in non-urban areas.

But a presidential election is not decided by the majority community alone — 2019 being an anomalous exception — and it would no doubt be easier for Wickremesinghe to appeal to minority voters if he did not carry the SLPP’s chauvinistic baggage. It would also encourage any potential crossovers who have so far shied away from any association with the SLPP leadership; although, critics could point out that a majority of the ruling party are still with the president and say “same difference”.

The countdown has begun, and President Wickremesinghe’s options aren’t unlimited. Historically, voters tend to punish incumbencies in times of crisis, and Wickremesinghe, despite his undeniably successful efforts in bringing Sri Lanka back from the brink, cannot count on the doe-eyed devotion of a grateful electorate.

Though macroeconomic stabilization has been largely achieved on his watch and Sri Lanka’s prospects are looking better than anyone had dared hope even a year ago, Sri Lankans are still reeling from the effects of the worst financial crisis in decades and many thirst for change. The president’s campaign surely recognizes this reality, but it is unclear whether its messaging has been effective in communicating his vision for meaningful change in the form of political, economic and social reform.

The weeks are flying by and the country’s first citizen has some decisions to make.

-economynext.com