By Rathindra Kuruwita

On April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday, the National Thowheeth Jama’ath, an Islamist militant group, carried out a series of attacks targeting churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. A total of 269 people were killed and more than 500 were injured. From the beginning, there were accusations of negligence from the highest echelons of the political and security establishment, and a number of petitions alleging fundamental-rights violations were filed against heads of the government and intelligence services.

The Sri Lankan Supreme Court considered 12 fundamental-rights petitions and concluded that the respondents – who included former President Maithripala Sirisena, former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando and former Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis – did not act on intelligence received about the imminent attack with the seriousness it deserved. The court also expressed its “shock and dismay at the deplorable want of oversight and inaction that we have been seen in the conduct of affairs pertaining to Security, Law and Order and Intelligence.” It is important to note that President Ranil Wickremesinghe – the prime minister at the time of the attack – was named as a defendant in all the cases but removed as a defendant in July 2022 as he holds the position of executive president and so has immunity from prosecution.

Sri Lanka’s 1978 Constitution introduced the executive presidency in a bid to facilitate the state’s agenda of expedited economic development. However, it is now broadly recognized that the concentration of executive powers in one individual and the immunities attached to the office are inimical to the constitutional balance of powers. As the Supreme Court verdict shows, the concentration of all defence-related institutions under President Sirisena hindered officials in charge of security and intelligence from carrying out their duties.

Crackdown on protests to continue?

Sri Lanka is currently going through its worst economic crisis since Independence and implementing austerity measures in line with the recommendations on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A few days ago, the government announced that it will reduce the size of the country’s army to 135,000 personnel by 2024, from the current cadre of 200,000. The number is to be further reduced to 100,000 by 2030. Over 300,000 Sri Lankans left the country for foreign employment in 2022 and a large number of Sri Lankans are expected to lose their jobs. There are many studies pointing to a causal relationship between structural adjustment and political instability, and it is quite likely that social unrest will spread in the coming months. To prepare, the government would naturally look for a loyalist when it is time to appoint a new police chief – especially since the army declared during the massive anti-government protests last year that it would remain neutral.

The Supreme Court not only fined Nilantha Jayawardena but also instructed the state to take appropriate disciplinary action against him for his lapses and failures in the lead-up to the attacks. Jayawardena is currently the second most senior officer of the Sri Lanka Police, behind the IGP C. D. Wickremeratne, and was in line to take over the top position after Wickremeratne’s retirement. Senior DIGs Priyantha Weerasooriya, Deshabandu Tennekoon and Lalith Pathinayake are the other contenders for the post. Tennekoon, the most high-profile of the trio, is closely aligned with the current administration – a recent court case has accused him of not taking steps to prevent pro-Rajapaksa supporters from attacking anti-government protestors in May 2022. Jayawardena’s disqualification could open the door for Tennekoon, who is the most likely among the contenders to follow the government’s instructions, should they come, to crack down on future anti-government protests.

If there is a lesson to be drawn from the investigations into the Easter Sunday attacks, it is that the results of politicians using intelligence agencies and other national security institutions to further their personal agendas can be devastating. For the past few decades, especially after the end of the war, the Rajapaksas used the intelligence agencies and the military to intimidate their political opponents, to influence voters and to help with election campaigns. The 2015 Yahapalanaya administration led by Sirisena and Wickremesinghe, also promoted officials to top security positions based on their political loyalties – for instance, the appointment of Pujith Jayasundara as the IGP. Following the constitutional coup of 2018, several senior officials and politicians were side-lined from the national security decision-making process. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and IGP Jayasundara were not invited to the National Security Council meetings. Such political manoeuvring prevented intelligence and security officials from sharing crucial information on the imminent attacks. The current attempts to appoint a politically loyal IGP, which may leave Sri Lanka vulnerable to security threats in the future, show that lessons have not been learnt from this disaster.

-Rathindra Kuruwita, a journalist and a researcher based in Colombo, holds a MSc in Strategic Studies and writes on security and international relations. He can be reached on rathindra984@gmail.com.  This article was originally featured on himalmag.com

Topics : easter attacks, Easter Bombings, local government elections, Maithripala Sirisena